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ANALYSISANDCOMMENT
DOCUMENTARYSANCTITY IN INTERNATIONALTRADE ANDTHE PROTECTIONOF
ENDANGERED SPECIES
R (Greenpeace Limited) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
[2002] EWCACiv1036, English Court of Appeal
Facts
Aconsignmentof Brazilianbigleafmahoganyhadbeen shippedby SEMASA, a Brazilian company, to its
agents,AlanThomas Craig Ltd, intheUnitedKingdom.The cargo arrivedat Birkenheadon 27Decem-
ber 2001.Bigleaf mahogany is listed under the Convention onTrade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES), of which the EUand Brazil are signatories.Brazil has listedmahogany under
Appendix III of CITES.That appendixrelates to a`ll specieswhich any Partyidentifies asbeing subjectto
regulation within its jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing or restricting exploitation, and as
needing the co-operationofother Partiesinthe controloftrade'.Under the Convention, species listed
under Appendix III may only be exported subject to the issue of an export permit.The issue of the
export permit is subjectto:
(a) the satisfaction of the state of export that the specimenwas not obtained in contravention of the
laws ofthat state for the protection of fauna and flora;
(b) satisfaction that the any living specimenwill be prepared and shippedwith the least riskof injury,
damage to health orcruel treatment.
The Brazilian environmental authority, IBAMA, was not satisfied that that species of mahogany had
been logged lawfully. They had refused to issue permits to many mahogany exporters, including
SEMASA.However, the exporters challenged thatdecision in the Brazilian courts. A ruling wasmade
by the Brazilian court to the effect that the IBAMA's treatment of the exporter could amount to a
flagrant contravention of the Brazilian Constitution.Export permitswere then granted under protest
by IBAMA.The goods thenpromptly left Brazil for Birkenhead.
In the meantime, IBAMA appealed against the ruling and sought a declaration that their refusal was
justified.The situationwas considered both by the CITES Secretariat and by the European Commis-
sion.Both concluded that IBAMAwasrightto refuse export permits.
Whenthe goods arrived at Birkenhead,UKCustoms and Excise declinedtoprevententryofthegoods.
Greenpeace sought a judicial reviewof Customs and Excise's decision to clear the goods.That applica-
tion was heard and dismissed by Scott Baker J in the High Court. Since then the goods have been
admittedintothe country.Greenpeace appealedtothe Courtof Appeal for a declarationthat Customs
and Excise had actedunlawfully.
Theissuewaswhetherunder theCITES (and EURegulation 338/97whichimplementsit) theimporting
state is obliged to accept an export permit which is in conformityonthe face of itdespite some knowl-
edge that the exporting state's authority responsible for issuing the permit was not entirely s`atisfied
thatthe specimenwasnotobtainedincontraventionofthe lawsofthat state for theprotectionof fauna
and flora'.
Decision
The Courtof Appealwas splittwoto one.Themajorityheld that Customs and Exciseneednot inquire
intothecircumstances surrounding theissueofthe exportpermit.TorequireCustomsand Excisetogo
beyondthe faceofthedocumentwouldgenerateuncertaintyininternationaltrade.Themajoritywasof
the opinionthatthe enabling Regulation and the CITES both do notenvisage the dutyof the importing
ANALYSIS ANDCOMMENT: JIML 9 [2003] 1 15
state to exceed documentary checks. In support of this construction,Dyson LJ pointed out that the
export permit is required primarily for Appendix III species ^ the l`east endangered of the . . . classes
of species'provided forunder theCITES.Under theCITES,Appendix I species arethosewhose export
is absolutelybanned and Appendix II are thosewhichthe Conventionhaslisted asunder serious threat
of extinction. Appendix III species are those which any contracting state identifies as needing super-
vision.On a practical front, the majority noted that the decision to accept or reject an importation is
oftenmadebyanofficial atportorborder.Itcouldnotbetheintentionofthe drafters ofthe Convention
and the Regulationthat such officialswould be facedwith issues ofthiskind.
Laws LJ gavethedissentingjudgment.His LordshipacceptedthatingeneraltheCITESrequirednomore
than a documentary examination of the export permits.However, he found that the circumstances
were so unusual that c`onsiderations of ecology and the protection of the environment' should
necessitate the rejection of the importation as Customs and Excise were clearly aware that IBAMA
was not satisfied with the exportation.His Lordship also doubted whether i`n the real world'such an
approach is likely to cause disruptionto international trade andwentonto say:
. . . in the end, I have to say that I regard it as an incident of trade in flora or fauna of the kind in question
here thatthe tradespeople take the riskof inconveniences and disruptions to their legitimate business, so
far as they are a necessary incidentof a robustenvironmentallaw.
Comment
Both the majority's and Laws LJ's interpretations of the CITES and the Regulationwere plausible.The
majority argued thatthe provisions required nomore than a documentary examination of the export
permit. Laws LJ concurred that documentary checks are generally sufficient but where there exist
circumstances suggesting that the state of export was not satisfied that the requirement under the
CITES had beenmet, the importing state has a duty tomake further inquiries and refuse importation
if satisfied that the export permit did not truly evince the exporting state's state of mind.The choice
betweenthe two interpretationsmaybe perceived as comingdownto a question of principle: is trade
in endangered species aboutthe environmentor international trade?
It may be said that the majority's view is too conservative and does not reflect the environmental
interests of internationaltrade.Itmayalso be arguedthat internationaltraders are generally becoming
more sensitive to environmental needs and interests and, as such, the law should reflectthis change in
attitude.Nevertheless, while it is easy to be critical of themajority's view, the practical fairness of the
majority's decision should not be ignored. After all, the court's first duty surely is to do substantive
justice for the litigants and only, second, should it be concernedwith policies of wider concern.
Itmight be borne inmind that Laws LJ's solution required an assessmentofthe importing official's state
of mind and knowledge.Not only is it difficult to test whether, and to what extent, the official had
knowledge of the state ofmind of the exporting authoritybut also, inquirieswould have to bemade to
satisfy himself or herself of the circumstances surrounding the issue of the export permit.To what
lengths should such inquiries be made? To go beyond the documentary basis of the CITES and the
Regulationwould lead to inconsistent approaches by different contracting states, ultimately jeopardis-
ing the current smooth implementation ofthe Convention among its signatories.
Another aspectofthe casewhich shouldnotbe ignoredis thatthe Conventionplaces theprimaryduty
toprotect Appendix III species onthe exporting state.The factthatthe exportpermithadbeenissued
under pressure from the Brazilian courts is irrelevant as far as the importing state is concerned and
rightly so. It is inappropriate for the importing authorities to inquire into the rightness of legal, judicial
andpolitical forces impacting onthe issue of an export permit.
JC
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CONTRIBUTORYNEGLIGENCEOF THE CONFIRMINGBANK INADOCUMENTARY
CREDITARRANGEMENT
Standard Chartered Bank v (1) Pakistan National Shipping Corp (2) Seaways Maritime Ltd
(3) SGS (UK) Ltd (4) Oakprime International Ltd and (5) Arvind Mehra
[2002] UKHL,House of Lords
Facts
Theactionrevolvedaroundaletterofcreditissuedby Incombank ( I`B'), aVietnamesebankinthe favour
of Oakprime (`O'). It was confirmed by Standard Chartered Bank (`SCB').The credit stipulated that
shipmentofthebitumen shouldnotbe later than 25 October1993 andthe lastdate for thenegotiation
ofthe letterof credit was10 November1993.
M, themanaging director of O, had arranged for the bills of lading to be backdated in order to secure
payment under the letter of credit.Presentment was late butthat waswaived by SCBwho authorised
paymentof US$1.15million on15 November1993.
SCB then sought reimbursement from IB but in order to so, had falsely represented to IB that the
documents had been presented before the expiry date. IB thoughmisled had rejected the documents
onthe basis of otherdiscrepancies notnoticedby SCB.SCB then sued the shipowners ( P`NSC'),O and
M fordeceit.
PNSCappealed againstthe awardofdamages ordered against it by Cresswell Jonthebasis thatthe loss
sufferedby SCBhadbeenpartly theresultof its own f`ault'withinthemeaningof section1(1) ofthe Law
Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act1945.Section1(1) reads:
Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other
person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the
person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such
extent as the courtthinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for
thatdamage . . .
F`ault'isdefinedins.4 as n`egligence, breachof statutorydutyorotheractoromissionwhichgivesriseto
a liabilityintortor would, apart from [the] Actgive rise to the defence of contributorynegligence'.
Themajorityofthe Courtof Appeal foundthat SCB's conductwasnot f`ault'as definedin s.4 because it
wasnot atcommonlawa defenceto an actionin deceit.PNSCappealed tothe House of Lordsbutlater
settled with SCB before the hearing. As far as M was concerned, his appeal against Cresswell J's
judgment against him succeeded on the ground that he had made the fraudulent representation on
behalf of O and was not personally liable. SCB were ordered to pay a large part of M's costs. SCB
appealed againstthatdecision.Margued in cross-appeal thateven if hewere found liable, the damages
should bereduced on accountof SCB's contributorynegligence.
Decision
Lord Hoffmann, in giving themain speech of the court, found that under section 4 of the Law Reform
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, a claimant could not be at f`ault' within the meaning of the Act
unlessitgaveriseto adefenceofcontributorynegligence atcommonlaw.LordHoffmann, relyingonLord
Hope's analysis in Reeves v Commissionerof Police oftheMetropolis [2000] 1AC 360, confirmedtheview
that the definition of f`ault' is divided into two limbs, one of which is applicable to defendants and the
other to claimants.Inthe case of a defendant, faultmeans n`egligence, breachof statutorydutyorother
actoromission'whichgivesriseto aliabilityintort.Inthe case of a claimant, itmeans n`egligence, breach
of statutorydutyorother actoromission'whichgivesrise (atcommonlaw) to a defence ofcontributory
negligence.The courtwas oftheview thatthat interpretation is consistentwiththerationale ofthe Act
which was to relieve claimants whose actions would previously have failed and not to reduce the
damageswhich previously wouldhave been awarded againstthe defendants.
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In decidingwhether M's appeal that SCB's damages should be reduced according to SCB's contributory
negligence, the House of Lords held thatthe authorities on the subject were clear (Alliance & Leicester
Building Society v Edgestop and Others [1993] 1WLR1462,Corporacion Nacionale del Cobre de Chile v
Sogemin Metals Ltd and Others [1997] 1WLR1396 and Nationwide Building Society vThimbleby & Co
[1999] EGCS 34).The position was that contributory negligence could not be a defence to a claim in
deceit.Itwascommongroundthat although SCBwouldnothavepaidiftheyhadknownthebillof lading
tobe falselydated, theywould alsonothavepaidiftheyhadnotmistakenlyandnegligently thoughtthat
theycould obtain reimbursement.Be that as itmay,Lord Hoffmann stated quite unequivocally thatthe
law would take no accountof these other reasons for payment.The court wenton to say that it would
not be just that a fraudulent defendant's liability should be reduced on the grounds that, for whatever
reason, the victim should not havemade the payment whichthe defendant successfully induced himto
make.
Finally, as towhetherMwaspersonallyliable for themisrepresentation, the Courtof Appealhadheld
that all the evidence indicated that Mhadmade the representation on behalf of O; as such hewas not
personallyliable.TheCourtof Appealreliedonthe authorityinWilliams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd
[1998] 1WLR 830 (House of Lords), a claimbased on the principle in Hedley Byrne v Heller [1964] AC
465 (negligentmisrepresentation).There, theHouse of Lordsheldthatjust as an agentcancontracton
behalfof anotherwithoutincurringpersonalliability, so an agentcan assumeresponsibilityonbehalfof
another for the purposes of the Hedley Byrne rule without assuming personal responsibility. Lord
Hoffmann however held in the present case that that authority does not apply to liability for fraud.
As far as his Lordship was concerned, no one can escape liability for his fraud simply by saying I` wish
tomakeitclear that I amcommitting this fraudonbehalfof someone else and I amnottobepersonally
liable.'
Itwas also obvious that Sir Anthony EvansintheCourtof Appealhadthoughtthatthe actionwasabout
suingM for the company's tort.Thatwasnotthe case according to Lord Hoffmann.Thematterwasnot
one foundedonthe doctrine of separate personalityin companylaw.Mwasliable notbecausehewas a
director but because he lied.
Comment
The House of Lords has made clear a number of hitherto problematic issues in this case. First, the
definition of f`ault' in s. 4 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act1945.The House of Lords'
approachwasverymuchonebasedonpolicy.LordHoffmannconsideredthat althoughtheloss suffered
by SCBwas largely caused by its negligence in paying against discrepant documents, the bills had been
falsely dated through M's conduct.M's conduct itself is sufficient to defeat a claim that contributory
negligence should reduce the amountof damages.It wasnot just for a defendantto claim a reduction in
damages on the basis that the SCB should have been more careful when accepting discrepant
documents.While the policy basis is clearly evident, that approach is notentirely free fromdifficulty. In
the authorities cited (Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch.D. 459), the`victim'was careless (or acting
unreasonably, as Lord Hoffmann said) but ignorant of the deceit being practised on them.What if the
victim (for example, the confirming bank, SCB) was in fact aware of the d`eceit'and/or privy to the
enterprise to securepaymentfromtheissuingbank? Indeed, itmightbe arguedthat SCBinthe present
casewas aware of at least some aspects ofthe d`eceit'. Should the rule in Edgington still apply?
Theissuerelating towhetherM'sconductinprocuringa falsebillof ladingwouldattractpersonalliability
or not is also an interesting one. It was verymuch a matter of the appropriate characterisation of the
issue.The Courtof Appeal saw the question aswhether Mcould be sued for the torts ofthe company
anddecidedthematteronthebasisofWilliams.That, according totheHouse of Lords, wasmisdirected
for two reasons:
* the claiminWilliamswas one based onnegligentmisrepresentation, not fraud;
* the claimmade by SCBwas not based on M's actions as a director but as an individual (had it been
made onthe basis of his directorship, the court would have been justified inmaintaining the veil of
incorporation).
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Onecouldunderstandhow theCourtof Appeal approachedtheissues asitdid.The allegationsof fraud
wereraisedinacivilmatterand, giventheauthorityinWilliams, itis alltoo easy to deemthematter tobe
one governed by normal rules of civil liability, especially when the f`raud'might be perceived as being
t`echnical'.However, fraud in English civil disputes has always been given a disapprobation not often
associatedwith other civil lapses aswas reconfirmedhere by the House of Lords.
JC
MARINE INSURANCE ^ CARGO ^ DURATIONOF COVER ^
CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL LOSS ^ SEIZURE
Bayview Motors Ltd v Mitsui Marine & Fire Insurance Co Ltd and Others
[2002] EWCACiv1605, English Court of Appeal
Facts
Bayview Motorswere car dealers based in Provindenciales, in theTurks & Caicos Islands. In1997 they
bought two consignments, each of six vehicles, fromToyota in Japan.These consignments were duly
shipped from Japanto Santa Domingo, in the Dominican Republic, fromwhere theywere to be trans-
hipped to theTurks & Caicos.The carswere insured under policies issued by appellants,Mitsui Marine
and Fire Insurance Co Ltd. and three other Japanese insurers, for a voyage from Japan to Santa
Domingo, warehouse to warehouse. Both policies incorporated the 1/1/63 version of the Institute
Cargo Clauseswhich provide, interalia, as follows:
`1This insurance attaches from the time the goods leave the warehouse or place of storage at the place
namedinthe policy for the commencementofthe transit, continues during the ordinarycourse oftransit
and terminates either atdelivery:
a) tothe Consignees'orother finalwarehouse orplace of store atthe destinationnamedinthepolicy;. . .
c) on the expiry of 60 days after completion of discharge overside of the goods hereby insured fromthe
overseas vessel atthe finalportof dischargewhichever shall firstoccur. . .
If afterdischarge overside fromthe overseas vessel atthe finalportof discharge, butprior totermination
ofthis insurance the goods are to be forwarded to a destination other thanthattowhichthey are insured
hereunder, this insurancewhilst remaining subjectto termination as provided for above, shall notextend
beyond the commencementof transitto such destination.
5 This insurance is against all risks of loss or damage to the subject-matter insured but shall in no case be
deemed to extend to cover loss, damage or expense proximately caused by delay or inherent vice or
nature ofthe subject-matter insured. . .
12Warranted free ofcapture, seizure, arrest, restraintordetainment andthe consequences thereoforof
any attemptthereat. . .'
The first consignment was discharged at Santa Domingo on 11August 1997 and the second on
14 September1997.Cars deliveredunder these consignmentswere stored in a fenced-off parking area
within the port, to which the customs controlled access.The documentation in respect of the first
consignment was defective since neither the bill of lading nor the cargo manifest said that it was for
transhipment, whichwas a requirement of Dominican Customs regulations. According to the regula-
tions, transhipmentwould be allowed onrequestupon arrival of goods in the Dominicanport and it is
beyond doubt that this requirement was met on 30 September 1997 when the customs received a
legalised letter fromToyota stating that the cars were intended for transhipment.The documentation
inrelationto the second consignmentwas in order.
Despite strenuouseffortsby Bayviewandtheir agentsin SantaDomingo, itprovedimpossibleto obtain
the release of the cars from customs'control.On about18 November1997,Bayview learned that the
cars had been removed from the parking area about a month earlier and distributed to customs
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